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THE LEAST OF EVILS FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION
Leslie Southwick*
I. INTRODUCTION
There never was a time that I did not find him a fair, courteous, patient, and
impartial judge and, sometimes to my sorrow, a very wise and discerning judge.
In all these years I never found him anything but a wise, patient, and loyal
friend, always ready to give generously to a younger man from the great store of
wisdom which he had accumulated through the years. All the time I have been
practicing law he has been one of the men whom I held before me as a model to
be imitated, however far I might fall short of success in such imitation.1
These were the comments of the then-president of the Mississippi Bar at a
memorial ceremony for Chief Justice Sydney M. Smith in 1948. Chief Justice
Smith had been the longest-serving justice (39 years) and chief justice (36 years)
in Mississippi history. A memorial service is not the occasion for highlighting
faults. Instead, the best that was in a person, what he aspired to be and often
was, is expressed as part of the veneration that comforts those who grieve. Such
comments also articulate standards on which others may model themselves, also
no doubt imperfectly.
What was said about Chief Justice Smith includes what I believe to be the
traits necessary for an excellent judge. Integrity, patience and intellect, impartial-
ity and wisdom are the foundations for dispensing justice in a manner to draw
credit to the judge and to the judiciary.
Over two thousand years earlier, a philosopher described in even more utopian
terms what the characteristics for judges should be. As Socrates explained to his
pupil Plato, the person who dispenses justice must himself be virtuous:
[H]e governs mind by mind; he ought not therefore to have been trained among
vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, and to
have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quick-
ly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-
consciousness; the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should
have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young, and this is
the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily
practised upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is
in their own souls....
Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to
know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the
nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.
... Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the
other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time,
will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the
vicious, man has wisdom in my opinion.2
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Mississippi; Adjunct Professor, Mississippi College School of Law.
1. Phil Stone, Address at a Memorial Ceremony Honoring Chief Justice Sydney M. Smith, (1948).
2. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, IN THE PORTABLE PLATO 400-01 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Scott Buchanan ed.,
Penguin Books, 1977) (1948).
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Plato's Republic, with judges who have been virtuous since birth, presents an
ideal to which any practical system is bound to compare poorly. Working with
human clay, no selection process will form perfect results. The truly just person,
again to quote Plato, "does not permit the several elements within him to inter-
fere with one another ... ; he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own mas-
ter and his own law, and at peace with himself; .. .and when he has bound all
these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and
perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act . . . ."' Such people do not
exist. Still, the concept that those who judge best must have mastered their own
passions and prejudices before they pronounce judgment on the passions and
prejudices of others, is a compelling explanation of human nature. What is cor-
rect about the picture drawn by Socrates is that a good judge is more than objec-
tive skills or ideology. Those may even be secondary matters.
The Founding Fathers of our own republic sought to allow the best possible
individuals to be chosen as judges by giving the nation's highest ranking officer
the power to make the selections, providing oversight by the Senate, and then
insulating the judges from injurious influences by providing for life tenure and
protecting their salaries from diminution.4
The State of Mississippi has taken a more varied approach to selection of
judges. These are the procedures that have been used for the state's highest court
during the stated time periods:
1817-1833 Election by legislature.
1833-1869 Popular election.
1870-1916 Gubernatorial appointment to terms; possibility of reappointment.
1916-1994 Partisan election.
1994- present Nonpartisan election.'
Every procedure employed so far has engendered criticisms. Each change that
has been made must have been from a sense that the new approach was an
improvement over the old. Our present nonpartisan system, itself an alleged
improvement over its predecessor, is now subject to frequent censure.' One sig-
nificant selection process has never been tried in this state. It is the "Missouri
Plan," also called the merit selection system. It includes a nominating committee
that presents a list of possible appointees to the governor from which the person
named must be selected, followed at some later time by a retention election.
As we are again engaged in determining if there are better ways to choose judges,
I will suggest a framework for evaluating the various proposals. It is a simple one.
1) Does the selection process give sufficient prominence to what is important
about judges?
2) Does the selection process give undue prominence to what is unimportant
about judges?
3) What are the costs and benefits of the process itself apart from the quality of
the selection?
3. Id. at 449-450.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, 2 (2) & art. III, 1.
5. Leslie Southwick, Mississippi Supreme Court Elections 1916-1996, 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 119-121 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Supreme Court: Judicial Elections Producing an Odor, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 22, 2000, at 4H.
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Taking these criteria, a judgment can be made about the system that best
emphasizes what we are seeking without giving undue weight to what is mean-
ingless or harmful. There is no mathematical precision. A discussion of the real-
ities of the proposals requires common sense and freedom from cant. The best
answer will no doubt be far from a perfect one. We should strive to understand
what legitimately can be accomplished with each approach to selection of judges.
Plato's Republic sets too high a standard, but perhaps the description of Chief
Justice Sydney Smith gives us meaningful characteristics. If what we are seek-
ing is a mode of selection whose primary focus is on legal ability, impartiality,
integrity, temperament and similar traits, then we should avoid systems whose
primary focus is either on political contacts or political skills. However, one
piece of cant should be dispelled at the beginning. All the possible procedures
involve politics. A paraphrase of nineteenth century Prussian military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz is appropriate. He famously said that "War is the continua-
tion of politics by other means."7 Similarly, "merit selection" with retention elec-
tions, or executive appointment and legislative confirmation, or nonpartisan elec-
tions are all simply political selection by other names. Though the politics may
not be identically exhibited, it is likely just as impassioned.
In Mississippi and perhaps in most states, judicial politics means recurring bat-
tles in the philosophical warfare occurring between plaintiffs lawyers and busi-
ness interests. It has reached a pure and extremely caustic form in Mississippi.
The financial stakes are massive. Selection of a new judge on a closely divided
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, in which the selection may alter or solidify
a current division, would be seen by both sets of combatants as Armageddon.
We should long for the days in which judges were not seen just as votes, but
longing and ignoring reality should never be combined. There seems no reason
to believe that whatever the selection process, that these contending groups will
become less insistent about the outcomes.
The various procedures that have been used around the country will be exam-
ined. The focus will move from those that are perceived to be the most merit-
based to those that are considered the most base.
II. THE VARIOUS JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
A. American Practice
An overview of what is occurring in other states is a useful place to start.
Every few years some state will change its procedures, as Mississippi did in
1994 as is discussed below. States may vary their procedures depending on the
level or location of the judges. Thus subject to some slight adjustments and to
the realization that if a state uses a combination of approaches, what is listed
here applies to selection of appellate judges, this is the present utilization of the
different procedures:8
7. Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert, REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN THE PRESENT AND FUTURE, IN MAKERS OF
MODERN STRATEGY FROM MACHIAVELLLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 863 (1986).
8. Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining the First Amendment
Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y RE. 71, 74-75 (1997). The totals were
adjusted since the figures still showed Mississippi as being a state that used partisan elections. A somewhat
different summary appears in Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular
Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 313, 314 (1998).
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a) Appointment by the governor without a nominating commission -- 9 states.
b) Appointment by the governor from a list provided by nominating commis-
sion; subsequent retention election ("Missouri Plan") -- 15 states.
c) Appointment by the legislature -- 3 states.
d) Partisan election -- 8 states.
e) Nonpartisan election -- 14 states.
A summary from the United States Department of Justice for 1998 is that
twenty-one states select appellate judges through gubernatorial appointment,
three by legislative appointment, fourteen by non-partisan elections, eight by par-
tisan elections, and four by retention elections.'
A fair indication of the pendulum swings in sentiments around the country is
that all the states that entered the Union before 1845 provided for appointed
judges. Starting in 1846 and continuing until 1912, seventy-five percent of all
new states provided for election of judges."° The first use of what became known
as "merit selection" was in Missouri in 1940. No other state adopted that proce-
dure until 1958, but now at least 15 states use it in part. Missouri itself applies
the procedure to selection of lower court judges only in five metropolitan cir-
cuits. The remaining forty circuits select judges in partisan elections."
B. Merit Selection
Since Missouri was the first state to adopt a plan proposed by academicians
beginning in 1914, it has earned the name "Missouri Plan." There are variants,
but the concept is that a small group of individuals are appointed by specific
governmental and Bar officials to a nominating commission. Interviews, back-
ground investigations or other preliminary work may be undertaken. They agree
on a list of perhaps three names to submit to the governor. From this list, the
governor must choose the appointee. After the passage of a designated period as
judge, the appointee will be voted on by the people in an election not against an
opponent, but just as an up or down vote on retention. If retained, the judge con-
tinues in office for a much longer period before needing again to face the voters.
The make-up of the commission is of considerable importance. In Missouri,
the commission consists of lawyers selected by the bar association, non-lawyers
selected by the governor, and a sitting judge who chairs the commission. 2
The potential for merit actually being the basis for selection exists in theory.
The practice in the states has not been convincing. A potential is that committee
politics will substitute for electoral politics. My first close encounter with
Missouri appellate judges was at a judicial seminar not long after I was elected.
A small number of judges from around the country were meeting. In the begin-
ning rituals appropriate for such meetings, we each gave a few details about our-
9. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at http://wwwojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/courts.htm#selection (last checked 2/28/2002).
10. Donald C. Wintersheimer, Judicial Independence Through Popular Election, 20 QuINNwtAc L.R. 791, 794
(2001).
11. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process in the United States,
75 MICH. B. J. 904, 905-906 (1996).
12. David W Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13
Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 22-26 (1992).
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selves including how we were selected. The first of the four Missouri appellate
judges to perform this task said, with emphasis to make clear his sarcasm, that he
was chosen through the merit system. He laughed and said that merit being
combined with knowing the right people were the essentials in his selection. His
Missouri colleagues agreed when giving their stories.
What judges may in good humor say could be exaggerated. Indeed, perhaps
merit is still the foundation and politics just chooses among well-qualified peo-
ple. These four Missourians appeared to be able judges. What some studies by
social scientists have indicated is that a "merit system" at least creates a higher
level of minimum qualifications than do other systems: the Missouri Plan "has
tended to eliminate highly incompetent persons from the state judiciary."' 3 Thus
perhaps the floor for basic competence is raised. Is that all? The methodology
and purposes of the studies, the essentially subjective nature of some issues --
how does one statistically measure competence and temperament on the bench --
and other variables make conclusions uncertain about the quality of judges cho-
sen under different plans. Nonetheless, here are some of the conclusions reached
in various studies:
A summary assessment of the impact of the Plan on the Missouri judiciary indi-
cates that it has pushed the age at which lawyers go to the bench upward, and it
has also made prior judicial service a more important feature of an appellate
judge's experience. Moreover, it has not affected the essentially parochial char-
acter of the Missouri bench [being born and educated in Missouri].14
[Another] study found that a few more merit selected supreme court justices
attended prestigious law schools than those selected by other methods."
While the number of studies and available data regarding minority judges on the
bench continues to increase, it may still be too early to reach a definitive conclu-
sion regarding which selection method enhances diversity. The signs are, howev-
er, that merit selection is at least not an obstacle to diversity."
One of the most basic arguments of those who favor the [merit selection] plan is
that it produces a more qualified bench. To the extent that quality can be mea-
sured objectively, however, the evidence to date suggests that the Missouri Plan
does not fulfill its promise."
At best, these studies indicate that judges appointed by a "merit selection" plan
have somewhat different characteristics than those chosen in other ways. But the
differences are small and not necessarily meaningful. Another scholar surveying
the surveys determined this:
13. Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is Florida s Present System Still the Best
Compromise? Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 42 (1994, (quoting
RICHARD A. WATSON & RANDALL G. DOWNING, THE POLrnCS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JuDIciAL SELECTION
UNDER THE MIsSOuRI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 345 (1969)).
14. WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 13, at 219.
15. Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 42.
16. Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 41.
17. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform,
95 Am. POL. SC. REv 315,316 (2001).
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At the very least, one can determine whether different selection mechanisms tend
to produce different types of individuals as measured by ... variables [such as]
educational attainments, prior judicial experience, the absence of parochialism,
and so on .... And if the Missouri Plan is supposed to produce decidedly superi-
or judges, these results might be expected to show up in such data. However, the
research reported thus far does not lend much support to this claim.
Not only is there little evidence of the superiority of judges selected by the merit
system (although there is some evidence to the contrary), there is in fact little to
show that judicial selection mechanisms make any difference at all!
Where are we then? If the lay, the professional, and even the political inputs
built into the Missouri Plan do not work as advertised, and if the plan in general
cannot be shown to produce superior judges, what is left of the argument? The
answer is, not much. 8
Early studies, meaning twenty-five years ago before the explosion in high-
stakes tort litigation, already revealed distortions in merit selection. Forcing pre-
ordained results occurred in at least three ways: (1) the commission's submitting
a list that includes the person that the commission definitely wanted and two oth-
ers who were not serious contenders; (2) sending an even more cynical list that
includes a "political friend of the governor, one political enemy, and one from the
other party"; and (3) after a commissioner had been told by the governor whom
to name, the commission then sends that name to the governor along with two
others, the quality of the remaining names largely being irrelevant.19
In more recent times, it is inevitable that the politics that are endemic to elec-
toral contests, which pit high-budget campaigns funded by plaintiffs' lawyers
with high-budget campaigns funded by business interests, play out in committee
politics. The agendas of each "side" may be carried into the committee delibera-
tions by the members of the respective groups who are on the nominating com-
mission. Since the selection of judges is so vitally important to both interest
groups, the battle is first fought out among those who make the selections for
membership on the nominating commissions. Bar associations themselves are
riven by the divisions between the groups. Then, perhaps as important as any
factor, the governor may be beholden to and even have a background in one of
the factions. The governor thus may seek to make sure through the means
already described that the commission presents the "right" name.
The result has been that, while partisan political considerations may, to a certain
extent, have been removed from the selection process, politics is still a factor.
The forum for such political considerations has merely been shifted from the
electoral arena to the commissions and the governor's mansion.2"
18. HARRY STUMPF & JOHN CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1992).
19. Goldschmidt, supra note 13, at 51.
20. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 32 (1995).
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Finally, to the extent the retention election is thought to be a valuable correct-
ing device to the appointment process, the evidence is entirely contrary. Close to
ninety-nine percent of judges who undergo a retention election are successful.
2
Examples of situations in which judges were rejected -- California Supreme
Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues in 1986,22 Tennessee
Justice Penny White in Tennessee in 199623 -- are perhaps more important not as
exemplars of unfair campaigns against incumbents as some have alleged them to
be, but as proof of just how difficult it is for voters to pay attention during reten-
tion elections. If virtually every single judge is retained, and if exceptions occur
only if opponents are sufficiently shrill, then retention elections have no utility.
To be generic, a judge may be incompetent, inattentive to the position, and with-
out any necessary skill (which was not the concern about the just-named judges),
but unless the public is told that she turns heinous murderers loose, the judge
will be retained. More judges than one percent surely have been deserving of
being excused from further service, while the one percent that have been dis-
charged may not always have been the right ones for the voters to fire. An elec-
tion in which the focus is not on competing candidates but only on a judge's
record must not allow proper voter evaluations.
Though Mississippi has no experience with statutorily required "merit selec-
tion," three governors did voluntarily employ a variant of the approach to fill
vacancies. Starting in 1980 with Governor William Winter, a lawyer, and follow-
ing through the administrations of Governors Bill Allain and Ray Mabus -- also
lawyers -- a committee made recommendations to the governor. The system was
not employed by either of the next two governors. Six justices were named:
Lenore Prather (1982), James L. Robertson (1983), Mike Sullivan (1984), Joseph
Zuccaro (1987), Joel Blass (1989), and Fred Banks (1990). What is striking
about this list is that the first woman, a law school professor, an eminent senior
member of the Bar, and the second black justice all came out of the committee
procedures. The other two were experienced trial judges.
Despite the concerns expressed in this article about "merit selection," I
acknowledge that this brief experience with a similar process produced some jus-
tices who would have had a difficult time initially being elected and who proved
to be able members of the court. That political calculations factored into the
choices and that friendship with the governor was sometimes useful do not
diminish the quality of the credentials. If this pattern held true generally under
"merit systems," the concerns expressed here would be much less realistic. It is
unlikely, though, that Mississippi would find itself less subject to the internal
commission politics that have been experienced in other states with such selec-
tion systems. Indeed, developments in the Mississippi court system over the ten
years since the ad hoc "merit" procedures were abandoned suggests that the risks
2 1. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOYOLA L. REv. 1429, 1430
(2001).
22. Dann & Hansen, supra note 21, at 1431-32. The case for the California judges' non-retention was made
in Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California
Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988).
23. Traciel V Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons fronz the Defeat of Justices Lanphier
and White, 83 JuDIcATURE 68, 70 (1999).
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of merit being superseded by viewpoint are higher than ever. In fact, the dismay
about the impact of money and the propriety of the message being presented in
judicial campaigns begins with a campaign in 1990,24 just as this temporary nom-
inating committee experiment was drawing to a close. In 1996 for the first time
since 1940, there was a contest for all four Supreme Court positions on the bal-
lot. That was repeated in 2000.25 The high stakes with which the judicial selec-
tion game has been played since 1990 would not likely change just because the
selection method was adjusted.
In summary, merit selection is buffeted by the same influences and involves the
same participants as do judicial elections, but these activities are behind the veil
of committee formation and then the secrecy of the selection process. The reten-
tion election aspect is either irrelevant or embarrassing. It is the philosophical
agenda of the governor and a majority on the nominating commission that can
control the judges. Thus the baneful effects of the warfare between the competi-
tors in the tort system may more often than not lead to selection of a judge
strongly in one camp or the other. If merit in the sense of "fair, courteous,
patient, and impartial" judging, as was said of Chief Justice Sydney Smith, is the
goal, there is a considerable risk that nominating commission politics is more
likely to lead to an extremely partial judge. That core partiality may well domi-
nate over every other consideration as the stakes in the tort wars get even higher.
C. Executive Appointment, Legislative Confirmation
The federal model of appointment by the executive without any initial nominat-
ing commission, coupled with confirmation in the legislature is followed in nine
states. In Mississippi, gubernatorial appointment and senate confirmation was the
system established by the 1869 constitution and persisted, despite several efforts to
change it, until a constitutional amendment in 1916.26 There was no life tenure,
however. Justices had nine-year terms and then would need to be reappointed and
reconfirmed to continue on the bench."
A related approach just for filling vacancies was proposed in the 2002 legislative
session. The house and senate disagreed on how to amend a current statute that
required someone who is appointed to fill a judicial vacancy to run at the next elec-
tion for the remainder of the term. The proposal first adopted in the senate would
have allowed the appointee to serve the remainder of the term if he or she received
senate confirmation within one year of the vacancy.2" What was finally enacted,
however, provided that a special election would be held if more than half of the
remaining term was still to be served at the time of the next available election; oth-
erwise, the appointee would serve the remaining portion of the term. 9
24. See Southwick, supra note 5, at 165-77. After about 35 years of most Supreme Court elections being unop-
posed, in the 1970's and 1980's there started to be serious contests for at least some of the seats. The first high-bud-
get campaign with significant television advertising, largely focusing on the candidate's toughness on crime, was in
1990. It was successful. Id. at 175-76.
25. Southwick, supra note 5, at 182-88 (1996 elections); the 2000 elections are described at the end of this
article.
26. Southwick, supra note 5, at 120-21; Miss. CoNST. art. VI, 2 (1869); MISS. CONST. art. 6, 145 (1890).
27. Miss. CoNsT. art. 6, 149 (1890).
28. Miss. SEN. BILL 2289 (2002), amending Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-849, as initially adopted by the senate.
29. Miss. SEN. BILL 2289 (2002), as signed by the governor. The legislation received the required approval
under the federal Voting Rights Act on July 2, 2002. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-849, editor's note.
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With a federal-style system, the problems of the veiled politics of nominating
commissions and gubernatorial selection already discussed under the "merit sys-
tem" analysis are altered by making the politics simpler. No longer is the need
for controlling the commission necessary for a governor who is so inclined.
Instead, the governor's discretion is fettered solely by the need for ratification by
another political body, usually the senate but potentially both legislative houses.
If the politics of the governor and the legislature are the same, then confirmation
is likely not a meaningful check on the quality of the appointment. In fact, if a
business-oriented governor is confronted with a plaintiff lawyer senate, or if the
reverse exists, the quality of the appointment also may not be especially impor-
tant. There is a risk that the philosophy and not the experience, intellect and tem-
perament of the judge will control.
A fair assessment of gubernatorial appointment is that "executives appoint
judges who reflect their own values on important legal, political, and social
issues."3 That is no surprise, but the effect that has on the credentials and con-
firmability of judges needs to be considered.
Recent experiences with United States Senate confirmation of Presidential
appointments to the judiciary are a fair indication of the contentiousness that
arises under this sort of system. President Bush has not as of this writing even
named a Supreme Court justice, but commentators have spoken ominously of the
philosophical warfare that will break out between Senate and President as soon
as that opportunity arises. A Senate Judiciary subcommittee held hearings on
the need to consider the ideology of judges in voting on confirmation. 2 The
slow pace of confirmations at the end of the Democratic Administration, a time
when Republicans were in charge of the Senate, and the slow pace of confirma-
tions in the Republican Administration now that Democrats are in control of the
Senate, have been much noted. Each side in the debate has presented evidence
that its confirmation rate is better than that when the other party has been in
charge of the Senate, which is an example of the malleability of statistics.
For those who might be considering adopting an analogous procedure for state
judges, there may be relevance to the confirmation experience of United States
District Judge Charles Pickering of the Southern District of Mississippi. His
promotion to the Court of Appeals was stymied in 2002 by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. "While the Pickering nomination fight had its own trajectory, people
on both sides of the issue were keenly aware that they were testing the battle
lines for future confrontations over the ideological shape of the federal courts."
Differences between a Mississippi governor and a majority of legislators on the
controversial philosophical issues facing state judges could similarly make the
process a protracted and volatile one.
30. John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1461,
1464 (1998).
31. See e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Speculation Builds over Chief Justice Successor, CHICAGO TRgmuNE,
Feb. 17, 2002, 1 at 1 ("colossal confirmation battle" expected).
32. Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and
the Courts on "Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001," Tuesday, June 26, 2001, statements found
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hr062601 sc.htm.
33. Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects Bush Nominee for Judgeship, NEW YoRK TmIEs, Mar. 15, 2002, at A-1, A-19.
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This system's failure to employ retention elections is a benefit. As noted, reten-
tion elections are either useless or worse.
Were Mississippi to model its procedures on the federal system, the only veto
on appointments is likely to be based on ideology. That is no oversight at all
when the appointing and confirming authority are of the same ideological mind.
This system may lead to constant impasse when there are differences.
D. Legislative Selection
The legislatures in Connecticut, South Carolina and Virginia choose their
state's judges. In South Carolina the process starts with nominations from a
"merit system" commission from which the final choice is taken; without such
input, the Virginia legislature also elects its judges.' The Connecticut system has
the effect of merit selection with legislative confirmation. However, the provision
in the constitution states that judges "shall be nominated by the governor exclu-
sively from candidates submitted by the judicial selection commission," and then
"Judges so nominated shall be appointed by the general assembly .... "' Thus
the legislative action is not called "confirmation."
Legislative selection does not offer any obvious advantages over other systems.
Political considerations are likely to operate just as vigorously on legislators as
on governors. Though 174 Mississippi legislators could have almost that many
views on who should be chosen as a judge, the final decision would likely be
strongly affected by legislative alliances, traditional voting blocs, and the power
of the leadership in each house to force a particular choice.
It would be fascinating to see that process in operation. Mississippi tried the
procedure from 1817 until 1833. It does not appear sufficiently likely to reappear
to merit further discussion.
E. Nonpartisan Elections
The popular election of judges without partisan labels has only recently arrived
in Mississippi. In 1994, the legislature amended the election statutes to provide
that all judges would be chosen at an initial election held at the same time as the
November general elections for Congress. If no candidate received a majority, a
run-off would occur two weeks later. 6 Non-partisanship was to be assured in
several ways. One was the elimination of the need initially to be nominated in a
party primary. Another statutory section prohibited any reference to party affili-
ation on the ballot.37 It was made unlawful for a judicial candidate to "align him-
self with any candidate or candidates for any other office or with any political
faction or any political party at any time during any primary or general election
campaign."'  Candidates were prohibited "from campaigning or qualifying ...
based on party affiliation."39
34. Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or The Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv.
1197, 1210 (2000).
35. CT. CONST. art. 5, 2 (2002).
36. 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 564, 83, codified as Miss. CODE ANN. 23-15-981 (Rev. 2001).
37. MISS. CODE ANN. 23-15-979 (Rev. 2001).
38. MISS. CODE ANN. 23-15-973 (Rev. 2001).
39. MISS. CODE ANN. 23-15-976 (Rev. 2001).
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In order to make the prohibition of references to party stronger, in 1998 the
legislature passed amendments to prohibit political parties from raising money
for, contributing to, or endorsing judicial candidates."
The good government purposes of this approach are obvious enough. By
wringing every partisan connection out of judicial campaigns, what would be left
for voters would solely be the qualifications of the judicial candidates. Quite
obviously, though, removing party label has not removed politics. It has not made
voters focus on the qualifications of judicial candidates either. Since the 1994
nonpartisan election law, campaigns for the Supreme Court have without pause
moved rapidly down the path of increasing expense, disappearing dignity, and
heightened controversy. It would be too much to say that nonpartisanship was
the cause. It at least can safely be said that it is not part of the solution.
What Mississippi has experienced is what other states have as well:
"[M]ost commentators contend that, far from being an improvement upon parti-
san elections, nonpartisan elections are an inferior alternative to partisan elec-
tions because they possess all of the vices of partisan elections and none of the
virtues." Voters lose their main cue for information on who to vote for and, lack-
ing more relevant information on individual candidates, rely on other factors
such as ballot position or name recognition.
4 1
The opening comment in that quote is significant. Nonpartisan judicial elec-
tions have "all the vices and none of the virtues" of partisan elections. The vices
are obvious enough and certainly have continued unabated, indeed accelerated
since the nonpartisan "reform" of 1994. What in the world, though, are the
"virtues" of partisan elections? Simply put, the virtue is information. What vot-
ers appear to want in voting for offices of low visibility like judgeship are
"cues." Reformers have felt that the party label is the wrong cue. Certainly it is
an imperfect one. But when it was removed, nothing replaced it.
For almost precisely the same reason that the retention election concept has
been a total failure -- it "succeeds" in causing voters to focus on an incumbent
judge only if the campaign is caustic enough -- nonpartisan judicial elections
give nothing that voters take to the voting booth unless the campaigns have been
dramatic, which usually means negative.
Yet as the budgets for judicial campaigns have climbed, voters seemed to be
less and less able to distinguish between the candidates. A review of the margin
of victory of the four races in the 2000 election year bears this out. One candi-
date spent close to a million dollars in the campaign; other candidates had expen-
ditures exceeding $500,000; out-of-state spending by the United States Chamber
of Commerce and plaintiff-lawyer organizations was substantial. When it was
over, the voters in many instances went to the polls and split almost evenly.
Perhaps they felt equally confused, bemused, or abused by each campaign.
40. Id., amendment adopted over gubernatorial veto in 1999 Miss. Laws ch. 301, 16. This provision was
largely nullified by a federal district judge for the same reasons as caused the governor to veto it, namely, that it
infringed on free speech. Patrice Sawyer, Party Donations OK'd in Judge Races, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 22,
2002, at IA.
41. Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or The Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv.
1197, 1206 (2000), quoting Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1,26 (1995).
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District 1, Position 3. Jim Smith 51.8%, Frank Voller 48.2%.
District 2, Position 2. Oliver Diaz 51.3%, Keith Starrett 48.7% (runoff).
District 3, Position 2. Charles Easley 51.9%, Lenore Prather 48.1%.42
The fourth race qualified as a landslide, Kay Cobb 54.5%, Percy Lynchard
45.5%.
3
As a logical matter, it could be argued that the removal of party labels has
intensified the negativity of messages and increased the expenditures for the sim-
ple reason that the voters otherwise will have retained nothing as they cast their
votes for these offices. More likely, the intensity of campaigns would have
increased without regard to their partisan or nonpartisan nature.
To be discussed more in the next section on partisan elections, there are philo-
sophical differences between the person likely to run as a Republican and someone
who would run as a Democrat for judicial office. Imperfect and at times mislead-
ing as party labels may be, the real question is whether these cues are better than
nothing. It is obvious that voters are not likely to be making decisions based on
judicial temperament, quality of law school, or the performance of the candidate as
a lawyer in the courtroom. If the idea of removing party labels was that voters
would then shift to such matters, the idea has been proven false.
F Partisan Elections
Eight states continue to choose their judges by partisan elections.
Gubernatorial appointment is the standard approach for filling vacancies, and
merit selection may even be included at that time.
One of the reasons that partisan elections have fallen into disfavor is that party
label is so incredibly important in these elections: "In partisan [judicial] races,
the political party label may give most voters all the information they seek.""
For reformers, this otherwise decisive piece of information must be kept from the
voters to the point, as in Mississippi, of invalidating the election of someone who
transgressed.4"
At least two questions arise from this. First, is it proper to deny voters what
apparently they would use when voting for certain offices? Secondly, what is the
effect of the denial?
On the first question, it is a difficult argument in a democratic system to state
that voters who make these significant selections should not be told something
because they would find it too important. True, we do that with jurors. If certain
evidence is irrelevant, improperly acquired, or otherwise inadmissible, we bar it
from jurors' consideration even though, indeed because they might believe the
evidence is quite compelling. The justification for that arises from the overall
control over trials that must be exercised by the judges who preside. Quite dif-
ferently, judges and legislators do not usually restrict the evidentiary considera-
tions for voting. In elections, the voter is sovereign.
42. 2000-2004 MIssIssippi OFFICIAL & STATISTICAL REGISTER 652-53, 655-56 (2002)
43. Id. at 652.
44. HARRY STUMPF & JOHN CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 46 (1992).
45. MISS. CODE ANN. 23-15-973 (Rev. 2001).
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Similarly motivated restrictions beyond just not mentioning party labels exist
for political speech in judicial campaigns. In most political campaigns, freedom of
political speech is considered fundamental. The "First Amendment has its fullest
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office." Political speech was one of the core purposes for the First Amendment:
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of
self-government. 7 This reflects our "profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen....,,"'
Political debate can be polite or acrimonious; can discuss issues appropriate,
tangential, or even irrelevant to what a good voter should consider important;
and can use a variety of techniques of persuasion, from logic to emotion to just
plain decibels, all depending on the desires and abilities of the debaters. However,
within extraordinarily wide boundaries the debate cannot be state-controlled.
In the arena of judicial elections, however, the argument has been made that
there is a compelling state interest in blocking robust debate. The Supreme
Court has found no legitimate purpose in drawing boundaries for political speech
for elections of county supervisors or national presidents. However, the argument
is that the need to avoid the appearance of favoritism or bias, and also to main-
tain respect for the judicial process, allows speech in judicial campaigns, indeed
requires that speech be much more restricted. In 2002, the Supreme Court
answered some of these questions when it declared that Minnesota could not
through it Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit judicial candidates from announc-
ing "views on disputed legal or political issues."49 The Court found "an obvious
tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution
which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's
announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limit....
[T]he First Amendment does not permit [a State] to achieve its goal [of merit
selection of judges] by leaving the principle of elections in place while prevent-
ing candidates from discussing what the elections are about."'
Setting the constitutional issues aside, the narrower question on selection is
whether it is a net benefit or a loss to elections to take away party labels.
Certainly politics remains, the same politics that is fought out by the same partic-
ipants as would be involved if the campaigns were overtly partisan. Almost cer-
tainly, if there were party primaries for Mississippi appellate judges, Republican
candidates would be those who more likely would find persuasive the complaints
made by business interests that the tort system is being abused, while Democratic
candidates would more likely embrace the aims of plaintiffs lawyers. How does
that become an irrelevant starting point for voters?
In answering, it is of at least some importance that the major financial contrib-
utors to judicial candidates appear in recent elections to have found that single
46. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1991), quoting in part Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
47. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
49. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
50. Id., at 2541.
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difference in philosophy the only significant consideration. The mass of voters,
though, are not to be told a party label because, perhaps like children being
offered a choice between candy and vegetables, they will always choose what is
bad for them. So instead of party labels, voters are only to be given other more
useful information in order to choose among those items. That information, dis-
seminated through aggressive campaigns, is more likely than not something
memorable about toughness on crime. Extremism in the pursuit of electoral vic-
tory is the norm; moderation in order to defend judicial dignity is the exception.
The artificiality of nonpartisan judicial elections, which are as political as any
campaigns in Mississippi, serves no demonstrable purpose. Distortions in voting
behavior likely result, as voters do not vote without party labels in the same man-
ner as they would if given them. Indeed, voters may in large numbers cast their
ballots blindly or for essentially frivolous reasons. Depending on the area of the
state, that will benefit different candidates. One of the most vigorous objections
in 1994 to nonpartisan elections came from groups such as the NAACP. The
president of the state chapter argued that it was important for black voters to see
the party label, else "they will be confused, and it will dilute black voting
strength."51
G. Combination Approaches
Nine states use some mixture of concepts in choosing their judges. For exam-
ple, in New Hampshire, the governor appoints judges, but their confirmation is
considered by an elected five member executive council. In Florida, lower court
merit selection is an option to be voted on by each county. 2
Mississippi certainly can consider employing one scheme for appellate judges
and a different one for trial courts. In addition, merit nomination and gubernato-
rial appointment can be joined with legislative confirmation.
H. Recent Scholarly Study
One quite recent study by a Michigan State University political scientist has
attempted to "probe the myths of judicial reform."5 3 Professor Melinda Hall ana-
lyzed all the elections from 1980 to 1995 for supreme court justices in the thirty-
eight states that use partisan, non-partisan, or retention elections for those
offices. She focused primarily on accountability and independence. By account-
ability she means that voters were able to hold judges accountable based on "sub-
stantive evaluations of candidates or other meaningful considerations relevant to
the judiciary." "Independence" in her terminology is demonstrated if judicial
candidates are relatively free from simple partisan outcomes.' As she put it,
reformers argue that retention and nonpartisan elections encourage voters to
focus on these proper considerations, which means such elections provide
accountability and independence, while partisan elections provide neither.5
51. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Dissension Among Blacks Jeopardizes Redistricting Plan, Official Says,
CLARION-LEDGER, June 6, 1994, at B 1.
52. Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or The Backroom?, 41 S. TEx. L. REV.
1197, 1210 (2000).
53. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial
Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 315 (2001).
54. Hall, supra note 53, at 315.
55. Hall, supra note 53, at 326.
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However, she concluded that these correlations are quite weak.
Court reformers underestimate the extent to which partisan elections have a tan-
gible substantive component and overestimate the extent to which nonpartisan
and retention races are insulated from partisan politics and other contextual
forces.'
Professor Hall examined whether voters were able to discern ideological differ-
ences between themselves and the candidates for judge on the state's highest
court. She found that voters were able to determine and then respond to those
differences in partisan elections. 7 There are those who dispute that voters should
be considering an "ideological distance" between their attitudes on the major
questions of civil and criminal justice and the attitudes of the candidates for
whom they are voting. These reformers "believe that removing partisan labels
forces the electorate to seek information beyond partisanship about the accept-
ability of incumbents, thus enhancing the quality of the electorate's knowledge
and judgement."58 Of course, removing the label may not cause the voters to seek
any additional information. Instead, the removal may just add new uncertainties
to their voting.
The results of Professor Hall's studies of the supreme court elections in the
thirty-eight states over the fifteen year period were these:
1) Nonpartisan and retention elections are subject to normal partisan pressures;
2) There is some accountability in nonpartisan and retention elections, not
based on ideological distance between the voters' and the candidates' attitudes,
but instead based on whether the murder rate is perceived to be high or low;
3) Candidate characteristics are nearly irrelevant in nonpartisan and retention
elections - race, length of service, other qualities of experience. One exception
is that in nonpartisan elections there is some evidence that minority candidates
receive a smaller percentage of the vote than do others.59
In partisan elections, the results are different:
1) Ideological distance between the attitudes of the voters and those of the candi-
dates has more impact in these elections than in nonpartisan and retention elections;
2) "Some forms of partisan politics are important in partisan judicial elections,
thereby impeding independence, but concerns about accountability in these races
appear to be misplaced."6
In summary, Professor Hall argues that the "merit selection" system "has pro-
duced a selection system that is much less visible than judicial elections." Yet the
insulation seems only to obscure, not remove, many important partisan features
and influences in judicial elections. 1 To be sure, there are negatives associated
with partisan elections, including a much higher defeat rate for incumbents, that
56. Hall, supra note 53, at 324.
57 Hall, supra note 53, at 322.
58. Hall, supra note 63, at 322.
59. Hall, supra note 53, at 324.
60. Hall, supra note 53, at 324-25.
61. Hall, supra note 53, at 326 (quoting Henry R. Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri
Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 MiAMI L. REv. 510, 519 (1978)).
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have their own impact. Nonetheless, "several propositions traditionally used to
criticize partisan elections and to promote nonpartisan systems and the Missouri
Plan do not survive scientific scrutiny."62
III. CONCLUSION
If this essay appears pessimistic about all systems, that appearance is not
deceiving. Judicial competence, integrity and independence are the goals. None
of these systems are especially likely to give sufficient weight to such factors.
Yet some systems are worse than others.
Returning to the three factors that I listed earlier in this essay, I would find that
merit selection has the greatest potential for examining the qualities of character,
intellect and experience that should be the focus in judicial selection. The real-
ization of that potential is quite haphazard, and strong philosophical bias as
opposed to impartiality may instead become the central credential. This is also
true with elections. Average voters, even if confident in what they want as a mat-
ter of the "big picture," are not equipped by training or interest in examining the
fine details of judicial credentials. Surely no difference in this regard exists
between elections that are partisan and those nonpartisan. The voters are still the
same voters no matter what the ballot looks like.
Insofar as what system might give the most weight to irrelevancies, I find little
to distinguish them in practice. Whether appointment or election, those making
the selection may be controlled by their lesser natures. Friendships, political
alliances, and ideological fervor may dominate in appointments. In elections,
political skills and even former races for other offices can be decisive. In both
situations, those attributes will be little indication of the ability to serve.
Depending on how fervent the ideology or how overbearing the political focus,
these may even be impediments.
Finally, there may be costs as well as benefits just in the operation of the sys-
tem regardless of the quality of judges who result. For example, the citizenry
may gain confidence in the judiciary as a result of the selection process or
acquire a more negative view. Judicial elections are by far the most public and
time-consuming process (except for federal judicial confirmations), and there-
fore potentially have the greatest impact on the people. Well-financed negative
publicity about incumbents or challengers may cause all candidates to be viewed
as traditional politicians without any special claim to respect.
Even after election, the selection process may hover about the judge. Former
California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus captured the idea perfectly. He pic-
turesquely stated that after beginning service as a judge, ignoring the political
consequences of decisions is like ignoring "a crocodile in your bathtub. You
know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much
else while you're shaving."63 That applies to all the systems that do not provide
for lifetime tenure. Judges who face a future contested election, a future reten-
62. Hall, supra note 53, at 326.
63. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in The Bathtub: Maintaining The Independence of State Supreme Courts
in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NoTRE DAME L. RE. 1133, 1133 (1997).
[VOL. 21:209
THE LEAST OF EVILS FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION
tion election, or a future need to be reappointed and reconfirmed all have tub
crocs. The crocodile can almost be forgotten with the usual merit system, since
nearly 99% of those elections result in retention. The dangers are appreciably
higher in the other systems.
In my view, the worst appointive system is traditional merit selection. That is
because the retention election feature, meant to be a review of the quality of
judges once in office, is a complete failure. It is better to combine the features of
an independent and competent nominating commission, followed by gubernatori-
al appointment and senate confirmation for a definite term. At least in that situa-
tion, each component has the potential to add something useful.
Of the election procedures, the worst is nonpartisan election. It is a system
built on denying voters what they really want to know about judicial candidates.
If there are to be elections, then partisan elections are preferable. They should be
free of unconstitutional restrictions on political speech. The winner quite possi-
bly will be determined more by party label than any other consideration, but at
least that is a reasonable if imperfect gauge of significant ideological differences
between the candidates. Other differences are unlikely to be perceived.
Campaigns now surely must be mush for voters even when served up at an
extremely high temperature.
Choosing among these choices must not ignore the realities of Mississippi
judicial politics. For better or worse, the state has seen a dramatic surge in civil
litigation and the monetary amount of awards. What are in effect class actions
are being brought as a result of nearly-unlimited joinder of parties being permit-
ted in selected districts. Whether the results of the trials will be upheld on appeal
are vital to the overall success or failure of each side. Is any system likely to
choose appellate judges who are beyond the personal biases that pervade this
kind of ideological contest? If not, is there an elective system that will allow the
voters to choose meaningfully on this philosophical issue and others, either to
maintain a balance on the appellate courts or purposefully to seek a certain pre-
dominance? Is there instead an appointive process that will lead to balance as
well as ability?
I am tempted to answer those questions simply and pessimistically: "No." Yet
that focuses on probabilities. Instead I will close by focusing on possibilities. A
nominating commission, followed by gubernatorial appointment, followed by
confirmation and periodic renewal of that entire process, has some hope for suc-
cess. It depends on fairness and balance at each stage. Unfortunately, almost
everyone involved from elected politicians in each branch of government to
members of the Bar will probably be connected to one faction or the other. The
final stage, senate confirmation, is potentially more useful than retention elec-
tions but also could become a complete roadblock to any appointee out-of-ideo-
logical-step with a majority of that body. There is potential, though.
For all that, it appears that partisan elections would combine the substantial
negatives of being the most damaging of the systems to the image of the judicia-
ry and the most painful to the judges themselves, with the positive of being the
system most likely to lead to balance on the appellate courts. Mississippi is fair-
ly evenly divided politically. Republican and Democratic judges actually do have
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fairly distinctive world views. Thus the courts themselves would have some
prospect of reflecting that division, indeed, that balance. Such an outcome
appears the best that we can accomplish. Good government optimism can lead to
promoting systems that ignore reality. The reality is the incredibly high stakes
involved in judicial elections, which arise from the incredible sums of money
being won or lost in Mississippi courts. Until judges are no longer in the busi-
ness that occupies the undivided attention of the combatants in the tort wars,
there is very little hope that objectivity will reign among the insiders of an
appointment process. Instead, perhaps only the voters, admittedly the poor voters
who really do not want to review the credentials of judges that much, have an
opportunity to bring the balance.
When Jonathan Swift wrote his radical, though satirical, remedy for curing the
overpopulation and poverty problems thought to exist in England in the
Eighteenth Century, he called it A Modest Proposal. For some reason, my sug-
gestion that partisan elections are the answer to anything makes me think of that
title. Perhaps my similarly modest hope is that in the future when justices are
memorialized as were those in decades past, the ideas of integrity, patience and
intellect, impartiality and wisdom will continue to be mentioned without cynicism.
APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF 2000 SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGNS
In 1997, The Law Review published summary descriptions of the Supreme
Court elections from 1 9 1 6 - 19 9 6 .' Since that time, elections were held in 2000.
Also, at the time of this writing, the campaigns for 2002 are beginning to take
shape. What follows will bring the earlier article up to date.
A. 2000 [4 Elections]
Every presidential election year, the terms of four of the nine members of the
Supreme Court expire. In 2000 all four became part of the now-inevitable strug-
gle between business interests and plaintiff attorney groups. Each incumbent
could be identified as likely to find support from a specific side of this struggle
and drew a challenger whose support came from the other. Nonpartisan elec-
tions certainly can be intensely political ones.
It was anticipated that substantial expenditures supporting negative campaigns
would be involved for all the races. Predictions in May 2000 were that a success-
ful race in the Southern District would require at least $300,000. One winner in
fact would spend almost one million dollars.
Between the time of those predictions and the controversial events of October
which will be explained next, editorials were written about the dreadfulness of
the whole judicial election exercise. An able former chief justice, Armis
Hawkins, who always has been the holder of strong opinions, strongly urged in
letters to the candidates that they limit their campaigns to $35,000, not accept
64. Southwick, supra note 5, at 115.
65. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Judicial Election Cost on Increase, CLARION-LEDGER, May 21, 2000, at IA.
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any campaign contribution larger than $250, and not run any television commer-
cials.66 There were no takers. Though that result was unsurprising, it is hard to
say that the proposal was even in the best interests of the voters. If there are to be
elections, and if the campaigns have to try to reach and convince 300,000 voters
in a Supreme Court district, substantial expenditures are required. That reality
leads to some unpleasant consequences, but selecting those consequences had
irreversibly already occurred when the decision was made to have elections in
the first place.
Mississippi Educational Television provided a program for all the competing
candidates to appear and discuss their credentials. The two or three candidates in
each of the four races would appear together, with the different races spaced a
week apart on the broadcasts. Though that provided some introduction to the
voters, the number of voters watching was likely quite small. 7
Campaign finance reports filed in early October revealed that four candidates
had already raised between $200,000 and $270,000, while three of the four
incumbents (Prather, Smith, and Cobb), had raised between $100,000 and
$170,000 each. 8 By October 16, a new issue was raised that dominated all four
campaigns for the last three weeks until the general election. The United States
Chamber of Commerce began running television advertisements praising four
different candidates for the Supreme Court. The candidates being promoted by
these advertisements were unsurprisingly those whose support had been coming
much more from business interests than from plaintiff lawyers: Lenore Prather,
Kay Cobb, Jim Smith, and Keith Starrett. 9 These advertisements neither
endorsed candidates nor mentioned that an election was occurring.
Representative of the Chamber's approach was this message in the advertisement
for Chief Justice Prather:
[The television advertisement] begins with the photograph of a gavel and a pic-
ture of Chief Justice Prather slowly materializes in the background. The narra-
tion states, "Lenore Prather -- Chief Justice of Mississippi's Supreme Court;
Lenore Prather -- using common sense principles to uphold the law; Lenore
Prather -- putting victims rights ahead of criminals and protecting our Supreme
Court from the influence of special interests." As the narration proceeds, the
words "Chief Justice," "Common Sense," and "Victims Rights" appear on the
screen. The narrator then states that Lenore Prather was the first woman
appointed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and that she has thirty-five years
of experience.7"
In summary for all the advertisements, they described positive character-
istics of the justices, mentioned neither election nor opponents, and encouraged
viewers to contact a web site. There, a link to web pages for the campaigns of
66. David Hampton, Judicial Candidates Must Keep Moneychangers out of the Temple, CLARION-LEDGER,
July 2, 2000, at IH.
67. Candidates Go Statewide Live, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 5, 2000, at 1B.
68. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Judges Fall Behind Foes in Cash Race, CLARION LEDGER, Oct. 12, 2000, at IA.
69. Probe of Chambers JudicialAds Sought, SuN HERALD, Oct. 20, 2000, at A2.
70. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, No. 3:00-cv-778WS (S.D. Miss. Nov. 2, 2000)
(memo opinion), at 6-7.
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two of the candidates could be found, as could biographies of the other two can-
didates who perhaps had not established campaign internet websites.71 It was
later said, with no source cited, that this was a component of the Chamber's
"$10,000,000 campaign to support the election of judges with strong pro-busi-
ness backgrounds in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio."72
Certainly the Chamber was involved in many states' Supreme Court races as
were at least local plaintiff lawyer groups.
By the day after the first advertisements began, the president of the Mississippi
Trial Lawyer Association, Lance Stevens, was denouncing them. Attorney
General Mike Moore and Secretary of State Eric Clark also questioned their pro-
priety. The principal complaint was that the Chamber had not registered as a
political action committee and had not reported the sources of contributions nor
recipients of expenditures. The reaction of the various candidates will be dis-
cussed in the separate election summaries that follow. What is capsulized here is
that litigation began almost immediately. Because of threats of suits and other
action by Moore and Clark, the Chamber filed suit first against those two offi-
cials in federal court.73 The legal issue was the importance of the fact that the
advertisements did not use words such as "vote for" the individuals whom it
praised. A 1976 United States Supreme Court decision had seemingly made that
a matter of importance in applying the principles for political speech. 4
United States District Judge Henry Wingate held that the Chamber's ads con-
stituted "express advocacy" even though no explicit message regarding voting
appeared in them. The Chamber therefore had to comply with Mississippi cam-
paign finance laws.7
Almost a year and a half later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit overruled the district court.76 The Court found that with only one exception,
most Courts of Appeals have adopted the view that ... government may regu-
late only those communications containing explicit words advocating the elec-
tion or defeat of a particular candidate. These courts rely primarily on Buckley's
emphasis on (1) the need for a bright-line rule demarcating the government's
authority to regulate speech and (2) the need to ensure that regulation does not
impinge on protected issue advocacy.77
The Court found that the only exception "from this bright-line approach among
our sister circuits" was in the Ninth Circuit. In the precedent relied upon by the
Mississippi district court, the rule that was announced did not require explicit
words referring to elections:
71. Id. at 8.
72. John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State
Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENvL. L.J. 217, 218 (2001).
73. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Chamber Sues State to Keep Ads on Air, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 24, 2000, at IA.
74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
75. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, No. 3:00-cv-778WS (S.D. Miss. Nov. 2, 2000)
(memo opinion), at 27; Bobby Harrison, Judge: Chamber Must Name Sponsors, NORTHEAST MisSlSrPPI DAILY
JOURNAL, November 3, 2000, at IA.
76. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, No. 00-60779 (5th Cir. April 5, 2002).
77. Id., referring to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52 (1976).
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We conclude that speech need not include any of the words listed in Buckley to
be express advocacy under the Act, but it must, when read as a whole, and with
limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable inter-
pretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.7"
The requirement of express words would allow speech to be unregulated even
though its undeniable purpose was to affect elections. By being underinclusive,
though, such a rule would avoid chilling other expressions over which the gov-
ernment had no regulatory power under the First Amendment.7 9 After the 2002
decision was announced, Mississippi election officials continued to condemn the
Chamber's advertisements and expressed a desire to press on to the United States
Supreme Court.8
Three other suits about the ads were filed during the 2000 election campaign,
one in the central district race and two in the southern district contest. They will
be discussed below.
In early 2002, Secretary of State Eric Clark asserted that the Chamber had
spent $958,000 on the Mississippi campaign while the candidates raised $3.87
million; other reports said $400,000 was spent by the Chamber. 1 Expenditures
by other groups, including those that quickly formed to respond to the Chamber
ads, are apparently not included in these totals. One of the groups responding to
the Chamber, "Mississippians for an Independent Judiciary," reported raising and
spending $240,000.82 No reports could be found for another organization that
bought newspaper advertisements attacking the Chamber, the "Don't Mess with
Mississippi Committee."'
Determining how much was spent on these races by all groups and candidates
would be difficult. Without a doubt though, a new record was set in 2000. Also
without a doubt, that record will be broken.
1. Central District, Post 3
Justice Jim Smith (56), first elected in 1992, was running for a second term.
He was challenged by Frank G. Vollor (51) of Vicksburg, a circuit judge since
1989. Justice Smith stated that he had not originally intended to run for a second
term, but determined that he had unfinished business that needed to be addressed
during a second term. When Judge Vollor announced, he stated that there were
too few judges on the Supreme Court with experience as trial judges, which led
to decisions that were confusing and impractical to apply.'
78. Federal Election Commin v, Furgatch, 807 E2d 857, 864 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987)
quoted in Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, at _.
79. Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, No. 00-60779 (5th Cir. April 5th, 2002) at.
80. Jerry Mitchell, Court: Chamber Ads Not Political, CLARION-LEDGER, April 6, 2002 at lB. Attorney
General Moore, one of the named defendants in the suit, said the ads had been a "subterfuge to get around pub-
lic disclosure laws." Id.
81. Larry Bivens, Money, Ads and Judges, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 23, 2002, at IA.
82. Mississippi Secretary of State - Elections Division, 2000 campaign finance reports.
83. Foul? (Full-page newspaper ad), published in, e.g., HAT-rIESBURG AMERICAN, Oct. 29, 2000, at 10A;
NORTHEAST MississiPPi DAILY JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2000, at 8A.
84. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Vollor Seeking Voice in High Court, CLARION-LEDGER, May 12, 2000, at lB.
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The campaign was not especially combative until the last month. Both candi-
dates could be found at country fairs, craft festivals, flea markets, and other gath-
erings of voters. In September Judge Vollor listed three reasons that he was run-
ning: 1) "I believe decisions should be made based on the law and not on person-
al beliefs and political agendas;" 2) common sense needed to be returned to the
Court; and 3) "a belief that everyone before the Court should be treated
equally."' The lack of common sense was allegedly exemplified by an opinion in
which Justice Smith had determined that jurors could take notes during testimo-
ny but could not have the notes with them during deliberations.86
Later, Judge Vollor criticized Justice Smith for joining the majority in over-
turning a capital murder conviction of a man who was tried for shooting four
people in a Winona furniture store in 1996.17 Indeed, a television advertisement
supporting the Vollor campaign criticized Justice Smith for the high percentage
of death penalty cases that the Supreme Court reversed. As Justice Smith point-
ed out, he dissented in most of those.88 Judge Vollor decried the counter-attack
that was brought principally by plaintiff lawyers on his behalf, who formed and
funded a group called "Mississippi for Independent Judiciaries." They, too,
placed television and newspaper ads attempting to convince the voters that the
Chamber's tactics were outrageous. This new group's tactics were to be extreme-
ly critical of the Chamber and sponsor ads for their candidates. 9
When the United States Chamber of Commerce ads began, Judge Vollor called
on Justice Smith to stop them. An ad supporting Vollor said that the Chamber
was trying "to buy influence for the big insurance and drug companies, the same
companies that are against the patients' bill of rights and against affordable pre-
scription drug plans for seniors."9 With the transition phrase of "the same com-
panies," the ad managed to bring in a significant national campaign issue other-
wise not much discussed in a Mississippi Supreme Court race.
Justice Smith also thought himself the intended victim of a group assisting his
opponent. He had been told that members of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers
Association had put considerable effort in the spring to recruit a candidate
against him. "I think there is an attempt by a small wealthy group of trial lawyers
who have bound themselves together to take over the court."'" He did not say
whether Judge Vollor himself was the product of the recruiting campaign or just
the beneficiary of funding from those who wished to defeat Justice Smith.
85. Fred Messina, Supreme Court Candidates Tell Reasons in Race, VICKSBURG POST, Sept. 8, 2000, (inter-
net homepage).
86. Id. This was likely a reference to the following decision authored by Justice Smith:
Wharton v. State, 734 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss. 1998).
87. Theresa Kiely, Supreme Court Candidates Face offon Funding, CLARPON-LEDGER, Oct. 18, 2000, at 3B;
the case was Flowers v. State, 773 So.2d 309 (Miss. 2000) (modified opinion on motion for rehearing; reversed
because evidence about three other victims was introduced in the trial about just one of the murders).
88. Theresa Kiely, Supreme Court Candidates Face offon Funding, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 18, 2000, at 3B.
89. Mark J. Armstrong, Smith, Vollor Banking on Meeting Voters, VICKSBURG POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at Al.
90. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Candidates Bicker over Campaign Ads, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 28, 2000, at lB.
91. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Justice: High Court UnderAttack, CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 2, 2000, at lB.
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The campaign closed with legal skirmishes over the Chamber's ads. Justice
Smith asked the Chamber to stop running the ads, but the organization refused.
Judge Vollor brought suit. On the Friday before the election a Hinds County
chancellor ordered the ads stopped. 2 The Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit,
Antonin Scalia, lifted that ban on the following Monday, but then the same chan-
cellor reimposed it. 3 The election was held the next day with no testing of the
chancellor's authority to overrule the United States Supreme Court.
Jim Smith received 157,464 votes (51.8%), while Frank Vollor garnered
146,574 (48.2%)."4 Total contributions and expenditures for Justice Smith were
approximately $370,000. Judge Vollor reported $490,000 in contributions and
expenditures."
2. Southern District, Post 2
Justice Mike Sullivan died February 27, 2000. Court of Appeals Judge Oliver
E. Diaz, who had served since that court commenced operations in 1995, was
appointed to the high court by Governor Musgrove and took office on March 15,
2000. Justice Sullivan had been in the last year of his eight-year term, and thus
the November election would be for the next full term.
After the governor appointed Judge Diaz (40), another candidate for the seat
issued a press release. Judge Billy Joe Landrum (66) of Laurel had been a circuit
judge for 15 years. Judge Landrum argued that because of Diaz's business inter-
ests on the coast he would not spend the time on the position that was required. He
then alleged that the appointment was "to satisfy a group of people who contributed
hundreds of thousands of dollars to [Musgrove's] campaign." He closed by saying in
November "it will be Musgrove's choice versus the people's choice... ".1
The third candidate in the race was Keith Starrett (48) of McComb, who had
been a circuit judge for eight years. He emphasized the innovations he had made
as judge, including creating the state's first drug court program. Participants
could avoid jail if they found and held a job, remained free of drugs and attended
support group meetings. 7
Judge Landrum criticized Diaz for not having any experience in the gritty
world of trial courts, as compared to Landrum's 26 years of "seeing, hearing the
cries, whimpers, and sadness of those victims."98 He used a slogan in his news-
paper advertisements that he was "Tough as Nails!"99 As did Judge Vollor in run-
ning against Justice Smith, Judge Landrum found three reasons justifying his
race. He felt that judges on the Court were basing their decisions not on the law
92. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Chamber Ads Aimed at Judge Ordered OffAir, CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 4, 2000,
at 1A; Vollor v. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, No. G-2000-2128 S/2 (Hinds County Chancery Ct.
Nov. 3, 2000)(order granting TR.O.).
93. Judicial Ads Pulled Again After Restraining Order, VICKSBURG POST, Nov. 7, 2000, at Al. Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Vollor No. 00A406 ( U.S.S.Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (stay of T.R.O.).
94. 2000-2004 MissIssiPpi OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 652-53 (2002).
95. Mississippi Secretary of State - Elections Division, 2000 campaign finance reports.
96. Landrum Responds to Appointment, LEADER-CALL, Mar. 9, 2000, at 3-A.
97. Judge Qualifies to Run for Supreme Court, CLARION-LEDGER, Mar. 25, 2000, at lB.
98. Esther Campi, High Court Candidates Square Off at Forum, SUN HERALD, Oct. 10, 2000, at A2.
99. Many newspaper ads used this slogan. E.g., Tough as Nails!, MCCOMB ENTERPRISE JOURNAL, Oct. 6,
2000, at 7; SUN HERALD, Oct. 4, 2000, at A8; HArIESBURG AMERICAN, Oct. 4, 2000, at 7A.
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but on their personal opinions or political agendas." Secondly, he thought such
decisions as the reversal of the same capital murder conviction as Judge Vollor
had highlighted showed the Court had no common sense. Finally, he argued that
he was the candidate not affected by special interest money from those trying to
buy a seat on the Court. ' In other advertisements, he said that there was
"Revolving Door Justice" at the Supreme Court, alleging that forty-five percent
of lower court decisions were overturned in 1999.101 In newspaper advertise-
ments, Judge Landrum also informed voters that he had been a member of the
101 st Airborne, the "Screaming Eagles," and had been "hand-picked as an [aide]
to Gen. William C. Westmoreland."1 2
Judge Starrett's campaign ran newspaper advertisements emphasizing the suc-
cess of the drug court innovations, including favorable comments from Chief
Justice Lenore Prather and Attorney General Mike Moore. In the ad Starrett said
that people with drug problems0 3 "deserve a second chance. Violent criminals
and drug dealers don't." Endorsements from the National Rifle Association,
Mississippians for Civil Justice Reform, and the medical, business, banking and
manufacturing communities were publicized.?°
Justice Diaz differentiated himself from the other two trial judges by saying
that he was the only one among them who had appellate court experience, having
been one of the original members of the Court of Appeals in 1995. That Court
had caused an amazing turnaround of the huge backlog that had existed at the
Supreme Court prior to that timie.'0 s Perhaps indirectly responding to criticisms
about his business interests, which included his wife's operation of a bed and
breakfast inn in Biloxi, he said that he could spend time with his wife and young
children because appellate work is primarily reading and writing. "I think I do
my best work late at night. I can get on the computer and research and read any-
where I can plug into the internet. '" ' 6
When the Chamber of Commerce television advertisements first appeared,
Judge Landrum alleged that the beneficiary of them, Judge Starrett, was con-
demning the high cost of campaigns yet receiving "$150,000 in out-of-state
money" who kept their contributors secret.' 7 Judge Starrett assured voters that he
had no connection to the Chamber's activities, though he was thankful for them
as a counterweight to the personal injury lawyers [who] put their money behind
their candidate . . . 1o Justice Diaz brought suit in Harrison County Chancery
Court and received a temporary restraining order from Chancellor Thomas Teel
100. A Message from a Judge Who is Tough as Nails, print-out from Landrum website, Updated Oct. 23,
2000, in possession of author. The capital murder case was Flowers v. State, 773 So.2d 309 (Miss. 2000) (mod-
ified opinion on motion for rehearing).
101. Revolving Door Justice (Landrum ad), MCCOMB EMTERPRISE-JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2000, at 6.
102. A Man of Integrity (Landrum advertisement), NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Oct. 15, 2000.
103. People with Drug Problems... (Starrett ad), HATrIESBURG AMERICAN, Oct. 15, 2000, at 9C.
104. Real Trial Experience ... (Starrett ad), NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Oct. 22, 2000, at 12A.
105. Esther Campi, Supreme Court Candidates Differ on Issues, SUN HERALD, Nov. 1, 2000, at A- 1.
106. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Judges Ready for Relief in Race, CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 5, 2000, at B 1.
107. Landrum Questions Role .... LEADER-CALL, Oct. 19, 2000, at IA.
108. Dave Parker, Starrett Explains Chamber TVAds, ENTERPRISE-JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2000, at IA.
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stopping the ads for ten days." 9 Diaz said that "negative ads like these affect the
entire judiciary."1 0 Judge Landrum brought a similar suit in Jones County and
received a T.R.O. from Judge Frank McKenzie. United States Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia on the day before the election stayed Teel's and
McKenzie's orders and also that of a chancellor in Hinds County in the Vollor
suit." Judge Teel later that Monday afternoon held a hearing on a preliminary
injunction, since Scalia's order had only set aside the T.R.O. But the chancellor
found that no irreparable injury would result from denying the injunction. "2
In the election on November 7, Justice Diaz received 131,787 votes, Judge
Starrett 103,207 (30.9%), and Judge Landrum 99,548 (29.8%).3
Since no candidate received a majority, a run-off would be needed two weeks
later. Both of the top two finishers were concerned about the Chamber ads, Diaz
saying that he expected the Chamber "is going to keep dumping money into the
race," while Starrett said that he might run ads attempting to distance himself
from them.11 4 Perhaps because of Justice Scalia's order, no further court action
was taken before the runoff election.
With Mississippians being enthralled by the deadlock in the race for President
that would continue well into December, turnout for the November 21 Court
runoff was a major concern of each candidate. Justice Diaz prevailed, receiving
56,693 votes (51.3%), while Judge Starrett received 53,786 (48.7%). That was
about a third of the vote cast two weeks earlier.
The winner, Justice Diaz, reported $835,000 in contributions and expenditures.
Judge Starrett reported $340,000 in expenditures and $373,000 in contributions.
Judge Landrum raised and spent about $365,000.1"
3. Northern District, Position 1
Justice Jim Roberts resigned on March 1, 1999, in order to run for Governor in
that year's Democratic primary. Governor Kirk Fordice appointed former state
senator Kay Cobb of Oxford to the vacancy. 7  Timing can be everything. It
appeared that the governor was on the verge of announcing former senator
Cobb's appointment to a Court of Appeals vacancy when Justice Roberts surpris-
ingly resigned. Justice Roberts's term would expire at the end of 2000, so the
election would choose the person who would gain the next full term.
109. Diaz v. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, No. C2402-00-01086 (*Harrison County Chancery
Ct. Nov. 4, 2000) (temporary restraining order).
110. Chamber's Diaz-Starrett Ads Halted, CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 5, 2000, at 6B.
111. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Vollor (also Diaz and Landrum), No. 00A406 (U.S.S.Ct.
Nov. 6, 2000) (stay of T.R.O.'s in Harrison County and Jones County Chancery Courts).
112. Brad Branan, Court Candidates Lament Negativity in Campaign, SUN HERALD, Nov, 7, 2000, at A-1.
Diaz v. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, No. C2402-00-01086 (Harrison County Chancery Ct., Nov.
6, 2000) (order denying preliminary injunction).
113. 2000-2004 MISSISSIPPI OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 651-52 (2002).
114. Brad Branan, Diaz, Starrett Plan Runoff Campaigns, SUN HERALD, Nov. 9, 2000, at A-2.
115. 2000-2004 MIssISsIPPI OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 655-56 (2002).
116. Mississippi Secretary of State - Elections Division, 2000 campaign finance reports.
117. Pamela Berry, Cobb to Assume New Role as Justice, CLARION-LEDGER, March 3, 1999, at IA.
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Justice Cobb (58) announced for re-election. Her only challenger was
Chancery Judge Percy Lynchard, Jr. (44) of Hernando, who had been first elected
a chancellor in 1994. Much like Judge Landrum did in running against Justice
Diaz, Chancellor Lynchard argued that he was better qualified because of his
experience as a trial judge. Justice Cobb had gone directly from private practice
to the state's highest court.'18
Both candidates conducted active campaigns, traveling the 33 counties of the
districts in search of votes. Justice Cobb maintained some of her normal court
schedule in Jackson, and noted that the chancellor had something of an advan-
tage just by having his court duties keep him in the district."9
Chancellor Lynchard highlighted his years as a judge, six years as a chancellor
and nine years as a municipal judge. He said that Cobb "has slightly over 15
months of experience [as a judge] and I've got 15 years, so there's really no com-
parison."' 0 In campaign ads, he publicized endorsements of local officials such
as the Leflore County Chancery Clerk, the DeSoto County Sheriff, and a former
tax assessor/collector. 2 '
When the Chamber of Commerce ads appeared, Justice Cobb had raised only
about two-thirds of the funds as had Lynchard, $102,000 to $170,000. She said
that the Chamber "is coming in on the side of the financial underdogs" and "lev-
elling the playing field."'" Final financial reports for the campaign revealed that
Cobb had raised about $260,000 and spent $238,000, while Lynchard had raised
$484,000 and spent $453,000. '23 Justice Cobb received 157,258 votes (54.8%),
while Judge Lynchard received 131,350 votes (45.5%). '24
4. Northern District, Post 2
Chief Justice Lenore Prather had been appointed to the Supreme Court in
1982, the first woman to serve on the state's highest court. Since the senior jus-
tice becomes chief, she ascended to that position when the former chief justice
Dan Lee retired in January 1998. In her years as a chancellor and then a
Supreme Court justice, she had never had an election opponent. The 2000 elec-
tion would be different.
Chief Justice Prather (68) announced for re-election. Initially, Richard Daniel
Bowen (49) of luka and Charles D. (Chuck) Easley (51) of Caledonia filed against
her. Bowen was a member of one of the major plaintiff lawyer firms in northeast
Mississippi, while Easley was a sole practitioner. Bowen stated that the Court "is
in need of a better balance of the interest of the common people." Easley thought
118. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Judicial Candidates After Votes, CLARiON-LEDGER, Oct. 4, 2000, at 3B.
119. Jimmie E. Gates, Lynchard Challenging Cobb for Judicial Seat, CLARION-LEDGEPR, Oct. 16, 2000, at lB.
120. Matt Moore, Supreme Court Races Generate Big Dollars, NORTHEAST MISSISSIPPI DAILY JOURNAL, Oct.
22, 2000, at 6B.
121. Here is Why Others are Supporting Percy Lynchard for Supreme Court (Lynchard ad), NORTHEAST
Mississippi DAILY JouR AL, Oct. 22, 2000, at 4A; Percy Lynchard campaign pushcard, in possession of author.
122. Supreme Court Races Generate Big Spending, HATIESBURG AMERICAN, Oct. 22, 2000, at IA.
123. Mississippi Secretary of State - Elections Division, 2000 campaign finance reports.
124. 2000-2004 MssIssIPPI OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 652 (2002).
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the other two candidates likely to be backed by special interests. "I'm not owned by
any special interest... I don't intend to run a high-price campaign." '125
At the end of July, Bowen withdrew from the race. He said he was interested in
a circuit court position being vacated on August 31. Whether he already had
received assurances from Governor Musgrove for the appointment was not made
public. In October he was appointed to the vacancy.12
It appeared at the time to many people that the stronger of the two challengers
to the Chief Justice had withdrawn from the field, leaving a much easier contest
for her. Mr. Easley did not abandon the field though. On the day that Bowen was
appointed to the trial court, Easley reminded voters of his candidacy by attacking
Prather. He said that she is leading the court down the wrong path. What he
alleged is that the Court "doesn't recognize victim's rights; it's more interested in
protecting criminals." Easley also argued that the Court did not work hard
enough. If another chief justice took over, the court would be more effective.127
He called Prather "the most liberal member of the Supreme Court." He found
that she had voted "to reverse the convictions of over 100 murderers. She has
voted against the death penalty more than any other member of the Supreme
Court." 2
By the time of the post-election analyses that attempted to explain Chief
Justice Prather's defeat, many thought that her response to all this was too pas-
sive. Her expenditures were by far the lowest of all of that year's nine Supreme
Court candidates. She ran some television advertisements, but they were dwarfed
in numbers by the controversial Chamber of Commerce ads. In newspaper adver-
tisements, she trumpeted the endorsements of Senator Thad Cochran, former
Governor William Winter, former Lt. Governor Evelyn Gandy, and former
Supreme Court Justice Reuben Anderson. 29
The Chamber ads became an issue in this race as well. Chief Justice Prather
asked that the organization stop running ads on her behalf. She said that "out of
concern for both the integrity of our judicial system and the public's perception
of it, . . . I respectfully call on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to immediately
discontinue the running of these ads.""13 The response from those supporting
Easley was to run an ad showing individuals in judicial robes standing in a group
with large price tags around their necks. 31 Near the end of the campaign, Easley
loaned his campaign $100,000 for a large and late television advertisement
effort. This blitz may have been critical, especially when it was not being coun-
tered by the Prather campaign except through the problematic Chamber ads.132
125. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Two Candidates Enter Race for High Court, CLARION-LEDGER, May 6, 2000,
at lB.
126. Lawyer Quits Race for Court Post, CLARION-LEDGER, July 29, 2000, at 7B; Eileen Bailey and Sandi
Pullen, Bowen to Fill Fords Seat, NORTHEAST MississiPpi DAILY JouRNAL, Oct. 14, 2000, at IA.
127. Marty Russell, Easley Questions Prather's Record in Supreme Court, NORTHEAST MississiPPI DAILY
JOURNAL, Oct. 14, 2000, at lB.
128. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Prather Easley on Ballot for Court Slot, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 14, 2000, at
lB.
129. Justice for Mississippi (Prather ad), NORTHEAST MississiPpi DAILY JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2000, at 9A.
130. Press release by Chief Justice Prather, Oct. 20, 2000, copy in possession of author.
131. This information comes from two people, not including the Chief Justice, who saw the response ads.
They were largely generic and were used in other Supreme Court races as well.
132. Tim Kalich, ChiefJustice 's Loss a Stunner, PRESS REGISTER, Nov. 14, 2000.
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Mr. Easley won with 144,708 votes (51.9%), while Chief Justice Prather
received 134,039 votes (48.1%).1" That was a surprise to almost all who com-
mented on the race in the news reports. The Chief Justice would later say that
her failure to respond to the charges that she was soft on crime and had voted to
reverse too many criminal cases was a critical mistake."
Final financial reports revealed that the Chief Justice raised and spent about
$149,000. Mr. Easley raised $332,000 and spent $237,000.3'
In 2001 former Chief Justice Prather had an opportunity to close out her public
career on a positive note when she accepted appointment as interim president of
her alma mater, Mississippi University for Women.
B. 2002 [1 election]
When January 2002 arrived there were three campaigns for the Supreme Court
in the offing. The one position on the court whose election does not occur in a
Presidential election year, being that presently held by Justice Chuck McRae,
would be contested. Also, vacancies in two positions since the last election had
occurred, had been filled by gubernatorial appointment, and would need to be on
the November ballot to determine who would serve the remainder of the term.
A change to the three-race scenario began when, as part of Chief Justice Ed
Pittman's set of reform measures, the Supreme Court proposed that no special
elections be held to fill vacancies. Instead, all appointees would serve for the
remainder of the terms. As spring arrived and some early contenders for the posi-
tions began to surface, legislation was adopted that required a gubernatorial
appointee to run in an election only if more than half the term for the position
was still to be served at the first election more than nine months from the cre-
ation of the vacancy."'
Central District [this election was cancelled]
Justice Fred Banks, who began service on the Court in January 1991, resigned
effective October 31, 2001, to enter private law practice in Jackson. James
Graves, a Hinds County Circuit Judge since 1991, was appointed by Governor
Ronnie Musgrove and was sworn in November 1, 2001. Ceola James (55) of
Greenville, a chancellor since 1999, filed in early January 2002 to run for the
seat in the special election for the remainder of the term that was to be held in
November 2002. On July 2, the United States Department of Justice approved
the bill eliminating the requirement of an election if less than half the term
remains to be served. This election was therefore canceled. Justice Graves (48)
thus would not have to run until November 2004, as the term to which Justice
Banks was elected in 1996 expires in January, 2005.
133. 2000-2004 MississiPpi OFFICIAL AND STATISTICAL REGISTER 653 (2002).
134. Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, Prather Leaves Regrets at Bench, CLARION-LEDGER, Dec. 24, 2000, at IA.
135. Mississippi Secretary of State - Elections Division, 2000 campaign finance reports, reports filed through
March 31, 2002.
136. MISS. SEN. BILL 2289 (2002), as adopted, codified as MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-849(b).
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Southern District
Justice Chuck McRae's eight-year term does not expire until January 2004.
Nonetheless, the election for the next term will be held in November 2002. This
unusual scheduling is a vestige of the adjustments that were necessary after
Mississippi switched in 1916 from appointments to elections for Supreme Court
justices. The term of an appointment under the 1890 Constitution was originally
nine years. When that provision was amended to provide for elections, the cur-
rent justices remained in office until the end of their nine-year terms. The next
term following election would be eight years. Elections would be in even-num-
bered years contemporaneous with those for Congress. The closest such election
for two of the then-three seats on the Supreme Court was fourteen months prior
to the end of the nine-year terms.137 That fourteen-month gap has remained for
both seats, one now held by Justice Bill Waller in the central district and the
other by Justice McRae.
Justice McRae (63), who was first elected in 1990 to fill the remainder of a
term, then re-elected in 1994, filed for another term. Anthony Mozingo (40), an
attorney in private practice in Hattiesburg who had run close races for district
attorney in 1995 and 1999, filed but later withdrew. Challengers who remained
in the race were Jess H. Dickerson (55) of Gulfport, and Larry Buffington (49)
of Collins. Buffington has been a chancellor since 1995, while Dickinson was in
private law practice on the Gulf Coast.
Northern District [this elections was canceled]
Justice Mike Mills resigned to take office as a judge of the United States
District Court in Oxford. George Carlson of Batesville, a circuit judge since
1983, was appointed by Governor Musgrove (also of Batesville) to replace him
effective November 1, 2001.138 Justice Carlson (57) filed for election to the
remainder of the term, and he received no challenger. When the legislation was
approved by the Department of Justice that removed the requirement for special
elections if less than half of a term remained, the formality of an unopposed elec-
tion was canceled. Carlson could then serve until the end of the term to which
Justice Mills had been elected in 1996, which would be January 2005.
137. Southwick, Mississippi Supreme Court Elections, supra note 5, at 127.
138. Jimmie E. Gates, 2 Named to State's High Court, CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 30, 2001, at IA.
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MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1833-2002
[Following each name is a parenthetical indicating whether a judge was first
elected or appointed; from 1867-1915, there were no judicial elections. The sec-
ond notation reveals whether the judge died in office, resigned before the end of
a term, retired at the end of a term without running for re-election or being reap-
pointed, or was defeated.]
District 1
Original 1832 position (Post 1; most recent term began January, 1998)
William Sharkey (elected; resigned)
Colin S. Tarpley (appointed, resigned)
William Yerger (elected; defeated)
Alexander Handy (elected; resigned)
Ephraim Peyton (appointed; resigned)
H.H. Chalmers (appointed; died)
James Arnold (appointed; resigned)
Thomas Woods (appointed; retired)
S.S. Calhoon (appointed; died)
Robert V Fletcher (appointed; retired)
Sydney Smith (appointed; died)
Malcolm Montgomery (appointed; defeated)
Percy Lee (elected; retired)
Stokes Robertson (elected; retired)
Dan Lee (elected; retired)

















1916position (Post 2; most recent term began January, 1997)
Clayton D. Potter (appointed; defeated) 1916-1917
George Ethridge (elected; defeated) 1917-1941
Julian Alexander (elected; died) 1941-1953
Fred Lotterhos, Sr. (appointed; died) Jan. 1953 -Jan. 1954
Robert Gillespie (appointed; resigned) 1954-1977 C.J. 1971-77
Francis Bowling (appointed; resigned) 1977-1984
Reuben Anderson (appointed; resigned) 1985-1990
Fred Banks (appointed; resigned) 1991-2001
James Graves (appointed) 2001-
1952 position (Post 3; most recent term began January, 2001)
James G. Holmes (appointed; defeated) 1952-1961
Henry L. Rodgers (elected; resigned) 1961-1976
Roy Noble Lee (appointed; retired) 1976-1993 C.J. 1987-93
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District 2
Original 1832 position (Post 1; most recent term began January, 1996)
Cotesworth Smith (elected; defeated)
Rutulius Pray (elected; died)
Cotesworth Smith (appointed; defeated)
Ed Turner (elected; retired)
J.S.B. Thacher (elected; defeated)
Cotesworth Smith (elected; died)
David Hurst (elected; retired)
Harry T. Ellett (elected; resigned)
Elza Jeffords (appointed; retired)
George F Brown (appointed; new const.)
HF. Simrall (appointed; retired)
James Z. George (appointed; resigned)
Tim Cooper (appointed; resigned)
Thomas Stockdale (appointed; retired)
Samuel Terral (appointed; died)
James H. Price (appointed; resigned)
Jeff Truly (appointed; retired)
Robert Mayes (appointed; resigned)
Richard E Reed (appointed; retired)
J. Morgan Stevens (appointed, resigned)
William Cook (appointed; died)
Harvey G. McGehee (appointed; retired)
Neville Patterson (elected; resigned)
Ruble Griffin (elected/appointed; died)




























1916 position (Post 3; most recent term began January, 1997)
John B. Holden (appointed; died) 1916-1928
WJ. Pack (appointed; defeated) 1928-1929
VA. Griffith (elected; retired) 1929-1949 C.J. 1948-49
Lee Davis Hall (elected; resigned) 1949-1961
Robert Lee Jones (appointed; retired) 1961-1973
Harry Walker (elected; resigned) 1973-1987 C.J. 1986-87
Joseph Zuccaro (appointed; retired) 1987-1989
Ed Pittman (elected) 1989-C.J. 2001-
1952 position (Post 2; most recent term began January, 2001)
R. Olney Arrington (appointed; died) 1952-1963
Thomas Brady (appointed; died) 1963-1973
Vernon Broom (appointed; resigned) 1973-1984
Mike Sullivan(appointed; died) 1984-2000









































MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
District 3
Original 1832 position (Post 2; most recent term began January, 2001)
Daniel W Wright (elected; resigned) 1833-1838
James Trotter (appointed; resigned) 1838-1842
Reuben Davis (appointed; resigned) April-August 1842
Alexander M. Clayton (elected; defeated) 1842-1852
Ephraim Fisher (elected; resigned) 1852-1858
William Harris (appointed; resigned) 1858-1867
Thomas Shackelford (appointed; new const.) 1867-1870 C.J. 1868-70
Jonathan Tarbell (appointed; retired) 1870-1876
J.A.P. Campbell (appointed; retired) 1876-1894 C.J. 1882-85; 1891-94
Albert H. Whitfield (appointed; resigned) 1894-1910 C.J. 1900-1910
William Anderson (appointed; resigned) 1910-1911
William McLean (appointed; retired) 1911-1912
Sam Cook (appointed; defeated) 1912-1921
William Anderson (elected; defeated) 1921-1945
Lemuel A. Smith, Sr. (elected; died) 1945-1950
John W. Kyle (appointed; died) 1950-1965
Lemuel A. Smith, Jr. (appointed; resigned) 1965-1982
Lenore Prather (appointed; defeated) 1982-2001 C.J. 1998-2001
Charles D. Easley (elected) 2001 -
1916position (Post 3; most recent term began January, 1997)
Eugene 0. Sykes (appointed; retired) 1916-1925
James G. McGowen (elected; died) 1925-1940
William Roberds (appointed; resigned) 1940-1960
Taylor H. McElroy (appointed; retired) 1960-1965
William Inzer (elected; died) 1965-1978
Kermit Cofer (appointed; retired) 1978-1981
Armis Hawkins (elected; resigned) 1981-1995 C.J. 1993-95
Mike Mills (appointed; resigned) 1995-2001
George Carlson (appointed) 2001-
1952 position (Post 1; most recent term began January, 2001)
William N. Ethridge (appointed; died) 1952-1971 C.J. 1966-71
Robert P. Sugg (appointed, resigned) 1971-1983
James L. Robertson (appointed; defeated) 1983-1992
James L. Roberts (elected/app; resigned) 1992-1999



































THE LEAST OF EVILS FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION
MISSISSIPPI COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES 1995-2002
The Court of Appeals was formed by legislation adopted in 1993 and 1994. The first
elections were in November 1994. The judges took office in January 1995. There are ten
judges on the Court, two from each of five districts. The initial terms were staggered, so
that all ten judges would not come up for re-election at the same time. After the end of
the shorter initial terms that applied to six of the ten seats, all the positions have eight-year
terms.
Chief Judges are named by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for 4-year terms.
The Chief Judge then names two Presiding Judges, who have no set term.
First District
Post I (initially had a four-year term; most recent term began January 1999)
Thomas A. Coleman (elected; resigned) 1995-1999, PJ 1995 Choctaw
D. Rook Moore, III (appointed; defeated) 1999-2001 Marshall
David A. Chandler (elected) 2001- Choctaw
Post 2 (initially had an eight-year term, next term will begin January 2003)
Roger H. McMillin, Jr. (elected) 1995-, PJ 1997-1999, CJ 1999- Union
Second District
Post I (initially had an eight-year term; next term will begin January 2003)
John J. Fraiser, Jr. (elected, resigned) 1995-1997, CJ 1995-1997 LeFlore
James H. Herring (appointed; defeated) 1997-1999 Madison
Tyree Irving (elected) 1999- LeFlore
Post 2 (initially had a six-year term; most recent term began January 2001
Leslie D. King (elected) 1995-, PJ 1999- Washington
Third District
Post 1 (initially had a six-year term; most recent term began January 2001)
Billy D. Bridges (elected) 1995-, PJ 1995-1997, CJ 1997-1999 Rankin
Post 2 (initially had a four-year term; most recent term began January 1999)
Mary Libby Payne (elected; resigned) 1999-2001 Rankin
James Brantley (appointed) 2001- Madison
Fourth District
Post I (initially had a four-year term; most recent term began January 1999)
Leslie H. Southwick (elected) 1995-, PJ 1999- Hinds
Post 2 (initially had an eight-year term; next term will begin January 2003
Frank D. Barber (elected; died) 1995-1997 Hinds
B. Greg Hinkebein (appointed; defeated) 1997-1999 Hinds
L. Joseph Lee (elected) 1999- Hinds
2002]
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Fifth District
Post 1 (initially had an eight-year term; next term will begin January 2003
Oliver E. Diaz (elected; resigned) 1995-2000 Harrison
William H. Myers (appointed) 2000- Harrison
Post 2 (initially had a six-year term; most recent term began January 2001
James E. Thomas (elected) 1995-, PJ 1995-1999 Harrison
